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SUMMARY
The paper discusses the mechanisms of proactive learning in the Bulgaro-Belgian human 
trafficking business between 2002 and 2007 through three profiles, starting each time with a 
case study. The profiles and cases are the result of an in-depth study of 16 Belgian court files. 
The study reveals three profiles: post-violent entrepreneurship in prostitution (2002–2005), 
international and inter-ethnic entrepreneurship in prostitution (2004), and labour exploitation 
(2004–2005). Each time one can identify learning processes in the minds of the entrepreneurs 
when comparing their activities with those of their predecessors, as described in previous 
articles by the same researchers. The image that comes to the fore from our analysis is one of 
organisations that are successful in all sorts of ways at covering themselves against police and 
judicial investigations, and that at the same time in many places and many ways – both in the 
regions of origin and in the country in which the activities take place – manage to infiltrate 
the economy.
KEY WORDS: Bulgaria, human trafficking, labour exploitation, learning process
INTRODUCTION: CRIMINAL ORGANISATIONS AND HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING
In normal conditions, criminal entrepreneurs are unable to claim legality and the 
protection of the State. They can however try to push part of their activities under 
some form of legal protection, but they mainly have to call upon relationships built 
on trust in order to expand their edifices and to keep them going. Given that the 
cement that has to hold the structure together does not allow itself to be regulated 
by legal agreements, the criminal entrepreneur has thus to call on positive and trust-
assuring social capital (Black et al., 2001; Chambliss, 1978; Kleemans, Berg and 
Bunt, 1998; Klerks and Kop, 2004; Lupsha, 1983; McIllwain, 1999; Raub, 1997). 
Social capital can be bonding, bridging or linking, to the degree that it is either 
based on immediate family, close friends and neighbours” (i.e. bonding), or on 
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“loose friendships and workmates” (i.e. bridging), or even on “unlike people (…) 
outside the community, thus enabling members to leverage a far wider range of 
resources than are available within the community” (i.e. linking) (Woolcock, 2001: 
13–14). Rational entrepreneurship, whether or not protected partially by a zone 
of legality, is supplemented with social capital where legitimate cover is lacking. 
Entrepreneurs can, of course, learn from previous practices, for example, seeing 
how certain undesirable interventions by the police or the courts can be avoided, 
or how relationships of trust can be better supported. They can try to organise their 
own criminal system differently and better from an innovative perspective. This 
shows us how three elements may be helpful for criminal organisations: some legal 
covering, trust and learning. It is quite common in publications on human traffick-
ing (also in most of our own former publications), that authors develop the idea that 
either partial or full legal covering along with trust are what support this kind of 
criminal business. We still emphasise these aspects, but in this new paper we further 
develop the idea of the impact of “proactive learning” that we already proposed for 
the first time in a 2008 publication which, it seems to us, did not  receive warranted 
attention in the current literature on human trafficking.
Along with partial protection by a zone of legality and trust creating social capi-
tal, a third mechanism can indeed come into play in the structure of criminal busi-
ness, namely, proactive learning. Organisational psychology points out that calcula-
tive entrepreneurs learn from previous experiences, especially from what has gone 
wrong in the past. In order to analyse this latter point, we use the system theory of 
the learning organisation, which stems originally from organisational psychology, 
but has been adopted by criminology and applied to the Columbian drug cartels 
(Kenney, 1999) and to the prostitution networks (Leman and Janssens, 2008). Two 
different levels of learning can be distinguished. The first lower primary level of re-
adaptive learning is only found at the direct reactive level to sudden changes within 
the environment such as, for instance, learning from past police actions. The second 
higher level of proactive learning is found at the creative conceptual level and is 
more fundamental. The extensive structural changes in the criminal network, which 
operates here as a real learning organisation, occur at this level.
At this point, we also want to explain what we call human trafficking in this 
paper, and why. Our empirical materials consist of judiciary files of cases that have 
been treated by the courts in Belgium under the label of “human trafficking”. The 
Belgian Human Trafficking Act is very close to the UN definition in the UN Proto-
col (UN, 2000). So, the most obvious option for our paper seems to us to follow the 
same qualifications in our paper. For example: in terms of Belgian law, economic 
exploitation in relation to human trafficking is much broader than the term “forced 
labour”, which is based on compulsion in the strictest sense. The Belgian Human 
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Trafficking Act speaks about working below the level of human dignity, whereby 
use is made of a confidential indicators list and reference is made to severe under-
payment or deductions, poor housing conditions, threats, … No account is taken 
in the Belgian Act of whether the victims are doing this voluntarily or not, or of 
whether they regard themselves as victims of human trafficking. We know that 
one can open a debate about the content given to “labour exploitation as the objec-
tive of human trafficking”, but since the discussion about the definition of human 
trafficking is not the aim of our paper, and since we focus on the learning aspects, 
we continue to apply the labels used in the judicial files. We also find it perfectly 
defensible since the legislation in the countries where the practices happen seem to 
us to be a very important factor in labelling the facts, and surely so if this legislation 
is not in contradiction with the UN standards.
CURRENT BULGARO-BELGIAN HUMAN TRAFFICKING: A NEW 
STRUCTURE? A CONTEXT?
The typical structure in the various profiles of the human trafficking business is 
composed of a leader (who remains most of the time in the country of provenance, 
upon whose legislation and juridical and police practices he is dependent), some 
lieutenants (who move between the countries), and some executors who almost 
always stay in the country of destination and fall under the legislation and juridical 
and police practices of that country. The last ones are car drivers, safe-house keep-
ers, pimps, … For their defence, the organisation looks for the support of special-
ised solicitors in the country of destination. We see that some accommodations have 
been made in the country of destination over recent years. We see this as a result 
of “learning” from former experiences. One creates more space for agency; and, 
one adds some intermediary function between the lieutenant and the “worker”. The 
intermediary may partially take care of the interest of the worker vis-à-vis the pimp. 
In the case of extreme labour exploitation, one may see that it is added very often 
as a second activity to sex worker trafficking. The wife may be invited to work as a 
sex worker, the husband in construction. It may create a context where trafficking 
may be seen less as trafficking and more as “exploitation”. However, in terms of the 
UN Protocol (UN, 2000) and – in our case – of Belgian legislation, both activities 
when they are organised by one and the same entrepreneur, will surely still be seen 
as human trafficking business to which the Belgian Human Trafficking Act still ap-
plies. In other cases, where labour exploitation was not connected to sex work, our 
files were also labelled as human trafficking.
If we examine the modus operandi of the Bulgarian human traffickers who fo-
cus their activities on countries like Belgium, we can conclude that a number of 
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changes have occurred in how they expanded their business during the 1990s and 
how they do so today. The changes they have made mean that it is more difficult for 
the police forces to track down the organisers, and more difficult for the authorities 
to prosecute them if they have been caught. The proposition we will develop in this 
article is that the Bulgarian human traffickers are currently expanding their business 
along the lines of the model of a learning organisation. We will demonstrate this 
concretely by examining a few of the modifications they have made. Our findings 
are based on an analysis of 16 court dossiers and sentences from the 2002 to 2007 
period that we have been able to study, as well as on interviews conducted in 2009 
with police and magistrates about the current evolutionary shifts. These dossiers had 
already been reported on in the annual human trafficking reports from the Belgian 
national monitoring agency (Janssens and Le Cocq, 2009), but the developments 
were not discussed. We examine these dossiers with an eye on the findings from 
our former publications (Leman and Janssens, 2006a). We would emphasise that, 
with the reference to Bulgaro-Belgian human traffickers, we do not intend to make 
any ethnic qualification, but merely to indicate upon which material we support our 
conclusions. We do not in any way exclude thereby the idea that similar develop-
ments could be found among human traffickers from several other countries. The 16 
court dossiers are very voluminous and consist largely of findings related to various 
criminal acts spread over a period of two to three years, placed in relation to one 
and the same network that becomes reconstructed by the police investigators during 
the construction of a file. They are the 16 court dossiers to which we could have 
access, since people that could be seen by the police as “victims” were disposed 
to collaborate in the curriculum at some moment. The 16 judicial files are seen by 
the police themselves as very representative for Bulgaro-Belgian human trafficking 
between 2002 and 2007.
Since 2002, the European regulation on “free movement of persons” has applied 
to Bulgarian citizens, guaranteeing their mobility within the EU. The visa require-
ment was dropped on 1 January 2002 for Bulgarian citizens and since 1 January 
2007, when Bulgaria joined the EU, they have had the right as Europeans to stay 
for three months in other EU countries. It is important to know that Bulgarian citi-
zens are still required to hold a work permit, until 31 December 2011, in order to be 
permitted to work in Belgium. However, it is obvious that the 2002 European edict 
has created a new situation for Bulgaro-Belgian criminal entrepreneurs to exercise 
their business. 
The fact that some official agencies in Bulgaria are still very vulnerable to cor-
ruption nowadays is naturally beneficial to the criminal organisations (Janssens and 
Le Cocq, 2008). The Bulgarian criminal networks operate as authentic criminal 
entrepreneurs and have acquired considerable social respect locally and sometimes 
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even nationally through their economic investments (Leman and Janssens, 2006a). 
In a programme on the Belgian television station VRT (Panorama, 3.1.2010) about 
human trafficking from Bulgaria to Belgium, a Bulgarian examining magistrate 
declared that more prominent criminals are succeeding nowadays, after having ap-
pealed on the basis of serious illness, in converting their prison sentences to house 
arrest. It is also the case that the Bulgarian Criminal Procedure Code (2005, amend-
ed in 2008, Art. 234)1 does provide for an examination period for serious criminal 
evidence that, after an initial period of 6 months, can be extended by another 9 
months. Nevertheless, experience teaches us that, at least for countries like Bel-
gium, this is generally too restricted an examination period for these sorts of crimes. 
For a vigorous pursuit of a thorough financial analysis and a consequent prosecu-
tion much more time is needed.
As a consequence, this context permits criminal entrepreneurs to look for clever 
strategies. They understand that they can exploit the vulnerability of their own ju-
dicial administration. They discover ways for passive and active corruption. They 
exploit the precise and quite fragmented timetable that the law itself imposes to 
fight them. They also learn from the way the Belgian system works. And, in the end, 
they try to exploit all possible dysfunctions in and between both systems that create 
the context in which they are working. 
How does the development of the learning process work when seen from the 
point of view of a criminal organisation? The criminal entrepreneur can learn from 
two sources: the partner organisation(s) in an inter-ethnic setting, and/or some so-
licitors with whom one works to defend one’s own interest, who are entitled to 
study the files that are brought before the court in order to defend their clients. 
They can even copy the police reports and understand how the police operate and 
obtain data to justify a complaint, or they can discover how the police monitor them 
through telephone taps, infiltration, and the like.… And one may suppose that, in 
case of corruption of officials, these corrupted people also explain how the criminal 
entrepreneurs can best hide their activities. It is indeed in the interest of such civil 
servants that their corruption never should become apparent.
TYPES OF ORGANISATIONS BETWEEN 2002 AND 2007 
Our starting point is that the aim of the business of human trafficking – as is 
characteristic for most organised criminal entrepreneurship – is making and, as far 
as possible, maximising financial gain. The 16 dossiers studied demonstrate three 
organisational types: “post-violent entrepreneurship” aimed at exploiting prostitu-
1 Thanks to Dr. Ogghy Fortounoff, University of Plovdiv, for giving us the official English version of 
the Criminal Procedure Code.
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tion (8 cases, practices dating from the 2002–2006 period); international and multi-
ethnic collaboration, once again aimed at exploiting prostitution (3 cases, practices 
dating from the 2002–2005 period); and labour exploitation (5 cases, practices dat-
ing from the 2002–2007 period). These three types have been labelled by police of-
ficers in the field in Belgium. The officers think they may characterise the practices 
as such, starting from the control mechanisms in the business and from the jobs that 
are its objective. In the first type, we see a clearly evolving transition to elements 
of proactive learning by the entrepreneurs, following from experiences with ear-
lier “violent” practices that have been shown to lead to more easy collaboration of 
the sex workers with the police. Therefore, we call this a “post”-violent structure, 
because although it still remains characterised by elements of violent entrepreneur-
ship, it is qualified, however, by interventions of a non-violent nature, due to learn-
ing from past failures. In the other two types, it seems that such elements of learning 
from past failures have been introduced longer ago, but that they are being used 
more systematically now than previously. We will examine the three organisational 
types, but will first place them in a broader context.
How have these three types of organisation grown historically? There is an as-
pect of entrepreneurship present that attempts to position itself partly legitimately 
(Block, 1991). The financial modus operandi of the business is of the calculative 
type: a minimum of costs generating a maximum of profit and (re-)programming 
of investments from that reasoning. We shall successively discuss the three organi-
sational types and the developments that have occurred therefrom, each time in the 
case of the business of Bulgarian human trafficking oriented to Belgium that has 
taken place between 2002 and 2007. We do this each time via a case study, from 
which we then draw conclusions relating to the mechanisms of proactive learning 
entrepreneurship in the three cases. The case studies are presented with a focus on 
the process-like character in the treatment of the clients by the entrepreneurs. We 
reconstruct the curriculum of the people concerned, starting from the records in the 
files and trying to take an “emic” perspective in the choice of the words that are 
used to indicate persons. At the same time, we try to reconstruct an “emic” ration-
ale. It may make the ethnography less conceptually “orthodox”, but it does permit 
an insight rationale that is quite difficult to reconstruct through more classic meth-
odologies. One should see it as a reconstruction as is made in some anthropological 
research, for example, on mafia organisations (e.g. Blok, 1974).
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POST-VIOLENT ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN PROSTITUTION
Case study: Mr I. from the Bulgarian coastal town of Varna (2001; 2003–
2005)
The facts date from 2003–2005 and take place in the prostitution neighbour-
hood around Brussels North Railway Station. The police already know the former 
Bulgaro-Belgian pimp Mr I. from a dossier dated 2001 in Mons, where he emerged 
as a pimp in the prostitution world. Officially, he was supposed to be running a car 
import-export company in Bulgaria at that time, and he did not, however, run any 
prostitution business in Belgium in 2001. In Bulgaria he was, according to Interpol, 
known to the police in those years for various indictments such as burglaries and 
thefts, but at that time in Varna he set up a prostitution chain together with a Rus-
sian partner. His contacts with the Belgian prostitution business had come about 
accidentally at an earlier date, when one of his Varna prostitutes fled to Belgium. He 
was arrested in Belgium but, at the end of his preventive custody in 2002, the pimp 
Mr I. saw something altogether bigger in Belgium and The Netherlands, advised in 
this matter by his Russian partner in Bulgaria. This led to the setting up of a busi-
ness network, starting from the position of “lover boy” (which is largely a technique 
used by Albanian pimps), which had developed by 2005 into a network of girls 
who worked as prostitutes in Bulgaria, as well as in Belgium, The Netherlands and 
Germany. The central coordination was located in Varna. The former pimp Mr I. 
was resident in Varna thereafter. He has his lieutenants in Belgium. He officially 
remains a successful entrepreneur in the car import-export business in Bulgaria and 
is treated as such by his environment. 
Mr I. has the prostitution money brought from Belgium to Bulgaria via couriers, 
almost never again via Western Union, where it is laundered via the purchase of 
real estate, massage salons and expensive cars in the name of persons not involved 
with him. Mr I. and his close colleagues are also the managers together of a finan-
cial agency in Varna. According to one of the witnesses in the Belgian dossier, Mr 
I.’s massage salons in Varna give their services to some people from the police and 
justice service. Whenever such a salon is facing the prospect of an inspection, Mr 
I. is informed in good time. 
When the Belgian judicial authorities asked for the extradition of Mr I. in the 
context of a new dossier in Belgium, based on indictments from 2003–2005, this 
was refused by Bulgaria because he was standing trial for the same indictments. 
He was briefly arrested in Bulgaria but this was converted to house arrest. In the 
meantime, Mr I. is being driven around as a free man, “because he’s ill”. In the 
intervening period, Mr I. still has to face trial in Belgium for the indictments dating 
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from 2001 (dossier Mons), but this process had to be postponed because of the in-
dictments from 2003–2005, for which he is now being tried in Bulgaria. One point: 
in Bulgaria he was indeed arrested for those indictments, but immediately released 
on “medical grounds”, although with a prohibition on leaving Bulgaria. One con-
sequence is, however, as some Bulgarian police informed their Belgian colleagues, 
that there is a strong chance that the dossier in Belgium will very probably have no 
more people who are prepared to make a complaint about human trafficking against 
Mr I. Since Mr. I. has been released on “medical grounds”, it becomes easier for 
him to intimidate or silence possible witnesses via his helpers and partners.
How did the organisation work in Belgium? Mr I. had two lieutenants, known to 
the Belgian courts for car thefts and for exploiting prostitutes. Alongside these two 
lieutenants, the drivers of a number of minibuses are important. They brought the 
girls from Bulgaria and carried the money raised by prostitution back to Bulgaria. 
Another function in the organisation was held by the “madams”. These women 
received the girls, checked them and collected the money. Their task also consisted 
of organising the full-time use of the “windows”. 
Every month for three years, Mr I. received € 80,000 in Varna from the bus driv-
ers as the profits of the Bulgarian-Brussels prostitution that rightly came to him. The 
two lieutenants could keep € 10,000 euro for themselves each month, with which, 
however, they had to settle their operating and security costs. The girls had indeed 
been told when leaving Varna that, with profit-sharing, half would go to them, but 
the following was also deducted from that: the rental cost of the “window” to be 
paid to their “madam” – who had to pay the exploiter of the bar from that money – 
along with payment of all conceivable services offered by the “madam”, the travel 
and accommodation costs, the official documents… If you consider that all of this 
is deducted from the € 10,000 that each of the two lieutenants in place in Belgium 
was allowed to retain, and that they provided themselves with a substantial income, 
then you have an idea of the underpayment that the women in the business suffered. 
It is known that a sex worker over the years will have handed over € 200,000 to her 
“madam”. (Note that “madam” is the word that is used both to speak about and to 
address the female mediator concerned.)
The recruitment of the women in Varna was also well thought through. They 
sought out poor young women with children or girls from large families. Mr I. 
mainly used the lover boy technique. Most of the girls were recruited in disco-
theques in Bulgaria. Once in Belgium, the girls were ordered, just like the criminals 
themselves, to throw away regularly the SIM cards of their mobile phones so that 
they would be more difficult to trace. Acts of violence against the girls were perpe-
trated without hesitation, they were fined very frequently, they forced the girls to 
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use drugs, and only the “madam”, fully integrated into the system, remained in a 
position in which they would experience her as their sole support. 
To escape from poverty, these women enter prostitution consciously and regard 
it as a temporary life project for, for example, two years, in order to be able to con-
tinue their life sufficiently affluently in Bulgaria. In the Bulgarian city of Sliven, it 
is not regarded as abnormal that girls will work as sex workers and the boys become 
pimps. The Bulgarian girls can be seen as “circular sex workers”, who return to 
Bulgaria every three months using Bulgarian bus companies. Because of the win-
win situation and because of their legal resident situation, this group of Bulgarian 
sex workers has little interest in victim status with respect to human trafficking and 
refuses to collaborate with Belgian judicial authorities.
Learning entrepreneurship
The Bulgarian “violent entrepreneurs” have in recent years, compared with the 
1990s, evolved into “post-violent entrepreneurs”, because they have allowed their 
prostitutes some “agency” (Appiah, 2005), some space for the prostitute’s own ini-
tiatives. This has led to more candidates for prostitution, which in turn has led to 
greater competitiveness between them and lower prices being asked by the women. 
Thus, less violence has to be used because the women are slow to feel that they are 
being cheated. At the same time, buffers are built into the relationships between the 
women and the entrepreneur: the drivers-couriers and the “madams”. 
In Belgium itself, on the basis of his experiences with his Russian partner in 
Varna, Mr I. has come to the insight that he can best exploit a system in which the 
female sex workers work independently in the employment of a “madam”, who 
is actually their only reassuring and administrative contact point. If they have any 
complaints, they do best to speak to her. This is also psychologically the natural 
thing to do, because she is the only person who does not use violence. Compro-
mises about work are best reached with her. The other people around them use 
physical violence and intimidation. The “madams” themselves have an agreement 
with Mr I.’s lieutenants and with the minibus drivers. They have a mediating role, 
which is even more important because it is also the “madams” who make the agree-
ments with the owners of the buildings about the rental price of the “windows”. 
Neither the owners of the houses nor the “madams” themselves, who are actually 
the people that the Belgian courts can tackle best, have any direct contact with Mr I. 
and his Bulgarian milieu in Varna. The “madams” can tell the police that they do not 
actually employ the girls, that they are self-employed, and are not being exploited 
by the “madams” themselves, on the contrary… it is rather that they offer them pro-
tection. The girls engaging in prostitution can themselves testify on this latter point 
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in respect of these “madams”. For that matter, it is also not easy to trace what sums 
of money are involved. Most money is moved via courier services.
In addition, Mr I. knows perfectly how Bulgarian legislation works. He knows 
that illness keeps him out of prison, which keeps his chances intact for the problem-
free influencing of possible witnesses against him. He also knows that the examina-
tion time prescribed in law in cases of human trafficking is much shorter de facto 
in Bulgaria than in Belgium, and that he cannot be sentenced twice for the same 
charges, once in Bulgaria and once in Belgium. He uses this knowledge impeccably 
and allows himself to be prosecuted in Bulgaria, when he feels that well-founded 
dossiers about his business in Belgium are being created. Normally, he will be given 
a short sentence for secondary indictments that are more than likely to do with his 
car business and transport companies, and there is a real chance that he will not be 
convicted on the other indictments, because of insufficient proof or insufficient wit-
nesses who are willing to stand up and testify in court to confirm the indictment. 
In Bulgaria, the victim profile has also undergone dramatic changes. The victims 
are often in a win-win situation of deliberate voluntary prostitution. They form a 
group of voluntary economic prostitutes, with whom acts of violence are no longer 
necessary. The Bulgarian pimps have professionalised and understand that they can 
make a lot more profit with motivated, co-operative victims who are less inclined to 
make damning statements to the police and courts. The victims are paid more than 
previously, sometimes, for example, about half of the proceeds from prostitution, 
but they do have to pay their expenses themselves, and these are sometimes very 
high. As a consequence, in the end they get less than they were promised, but what 
they do get, in comparison with what the region of origin can offer, is just a little 
better. The victims do indeed still have to live in extremely poor conditions, much 
worse than promised, but they accept that.
INTERNATIONAL AND INTER-ETHNIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN 
PROSTITUTION
Case study: men of various ethnic origins who work together (2004)
The facts date from 2004 and are situated in the prostitution neighbourhoods 
of Liège and Brussels (Brussels North Railway Station). This is not about a hi-
erarchically arranged system. There are several partners, each making their own 
contribution. Thus, there is a Belgo-Sicilian pimp who controls the prostitutes in the 
neighbourhood. These are Bulgarian girls who are brought in by a Belgo-Albanian 
driver. This latter person is a family member of the head of an Albanian smuggling 
network, who has already been convicted twice in Belgium (Leman and Janssens, 
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2006b). This Belgo-Sicilian is himself not an owner, but does have two bars that 
are in the name of his life partner, a former prostitute. Telephone taps reveal that, 
at least locally, it is the Belgo-Sicilian who runs the show. Officially, the bars are 
drinking establishments where people can hire party rooms. Anyone renting a room 
has to sign that they are responsible for what is going to take place in the room. It is 
the waitresses who rent the rooms. What is very expensive in their rental agreement 
is the “window fee”. 
From the phone taps – a usual technique for gathering reliable information in 
judicial files – it appears that the gross takings that the waitresses can make are very 
high, namely up to € 7000 a day. Given that ten waitresses have a rental contract and 
that they each work every day in the month, this means that about € 2,100,000 is 
earned per month. The life partner of the pimp provides four shifts of 6 hours a day, 
whereby each shift costs € 100 in rent money, multiplied by ten girls. This means 
that € 120,000 monthly goes to the owner for the rental of the “windows”. It does 
not mean, however, that the rest goes to the girls. After all, here too, “madams” are 
used. These “madams” declared to the police that their job was to protect the girls. 
However, it turned out that they, too, had to collect money for the Belgo-Sicilian 
pimp, who demanded half of the total proceeds for himself and thus claimed € 1 
million monthly. In addition, the “madams” in turn demanded a sum for them-
selves. What we also see here is how only a small proportion out of the total profit 
available is left for the waitresses engaged in prostitution.
The waitresses themselves turn out to be girls without a work permit, and with a 
passport that entitles them to stay in Belgium for three months. Every three months 
they have to travel back and forth between Bulgaria and Belgium, a trip that they 
always have to pay at a high cost. Along with the Bulgarian girls, there are also a 
few Ukrainian and Belgian waitresses working there, too.
In another similar dossier, the monthly income of the organiser, who also con-
trolled companies in the real estate and catering sector, was estimated at € 62,500.
Agency and intermediatorship
The owner of the prostitution houses, the life partner of the organiser, works 
with a contract whereby the renters of the room expressly sign that they will accept 
full responsibility for what happens in the rooms. The waitresses themselves pay 
for “protection” to the “madams” and do not hand over their money directly to the 
pimp. This clearly reveals a strategy that the entrepreneurs “learnt” from former 
failures. The pimp is well paid by the “madams” because he has supplied the wait-
resses, who have themselves asked to do waitressing work in these places. Other 
intermediaries would not have given them that unique chance to earn some money 
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themselves, more than they would have earned in Bulgaria, and the intermediary is 
well paid for that, even if he does not directly demand payment himself. It was only 
through a phone tap that the Belgium judicial authorities were able to prove that the 
Belgo-Sicilian had control over the Bulgarian girls and that the owner was a front 
woman for the pimp.
LABOUR EXPLOITATION 
Case study: an exploitation route from Plovdiv to Charleroi (2004–2005)
A Bulgarian bus company has specialised in the transportation of men from 
the Turkish-Bulgarian minority in Plovdiv to Charleroi in Belgium, where several 
Turkish exploiters had them carry out non-registered work for private individuals. 
The Turkish exploiter would collect them between 7 am and 8 am from old houses, 
the property of a Belgo-Sicilian and of a Belgo-Turkish rack-renter, and bring them 
back between 8 pm and 10 pm in the evenings. They did renovation work in hous-
es, mainly belonging to Belgo-Turkish people. They were paid in kind (board and 
lodgings) and were promised wages.
The role of the Bulgarian driver, who was responsible for the transportation 
from Bulgaria, consisted of transporting Bulgarians who would stay and work in 
Belgium illegally, and in the smuggling of counterfeit money. En route, he some-
times stops in Dortmund (Germany), while sometimes his route is via The Nether-
lands, to drop off Bulgarians there, too.
Immediately on arrival, the Bulgarian bus driver pays € 100 per month per 
worker for the safe houses of the rack-renter, which he will deduct later from the 
workers’ wages. The workers themselves get € 300 as an advance. However, each 
worker pays € 250 for the bus journey, € 100 of which has to be paid in advance 
and € 150 in arrears. The actual wages are set at € 30 a day, for which they have to 
work 12 hours a day. In fact it turns out that, once they are working, the workers 
sleep with 10 to 15 people in a single bedroom, and sometimes are only given € 30 a 
week, because the costs for food, rent and the bus journey have been deducted from 
their wages. As a result, at the end of his work and a stay of 10 months, one of the 
Turkish-Bulgarian workers had managed to save € 1 300, that is, € 130 per month 
for working 12 hours a day.
The organisers of the business would retort that the people involved would prob-
ably not have earned more, in their specific case, in Bulgaria, and this has indeed 
led as a consequence to not all workers wishing to lodge a complaint. The aspect 
of exploitation and unfair money profiting by the organisers is, however, patently 
obvious.
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An interesting aspect that deserves closer research in the future, but not restrict-
ed to the human trafficking issue, is the connection between the Turkish-Bulgarian 
minority, Turks in Turkey and Euro-Turkish immigrants from Turkey in Europe. 
This is an ethnic and trans-national dimension that surely should become a subject 
of research.
Learning to cover oneself
To restrict ourselves here to the Bulgarian side of the trade, it is conspicuous that 
the Bulgarian bus driver has once again covered himself against personal prosecu-
tion, by making sure that the exploitation lies mainly with the Belgo-Turks. He pays 
an advance that is clearly much higher than what will later appear to have been paid. 
He also pays the room rental and cannot be held responsible for the fact that such a 
room is subsequently filled with 10 to 15 people by the rack-renter.
DISCUSSION
With the first profile, the post-violent entrepreneurship, we are confronted with 
a Bulgarian businessman and his environment in Sliven (or as the case may be, the 
coastal town of Varna). The man quite clearly has good contacts in some circles of 
the police and judicial world. He recycles his prostitution money by buying land 
and building small hotels in the Bulgarian coastal region. He also controls a finan-
cial institution through which the money can come in and where candidates can 
borrow money.
If necessary, he will collaborate, in the context of opportunistic outsourcing, 
with Belgian bars or Italian owners of buildings but, because of the current domi-
nant Bulgarian market position in prostitution, this is not essential for him.
He works in a modern “agent” sensitive approach that builds in buffers. If com-
pared with the Bulgarian entrepreneurs who operated in earlier years (see Leman 
and Janssens, 2006a, 2007a, 2007b), then it is conspicuous that the entrepreneur 
nowadays is much more cautious about dealing with agencies like Western Un-
ion to transfer his money to Bulgaria. He prefers to use minibus drivers as couri-
ers. Another new, important and striking buffering link in the business structure 
is the “madams” (i.e. female mediators). Together with a very restricted number 
of supervising lieutenants, two for the whole of the Benelux, the “madams” are 
the only people in the current Bulgarian structure who work outside Bulgaria. The 
“madams” are Bulgarian prostitutes or former prostitutes who are in charge of their 
colleagues, guard the bars and act as go-betweens for all possible contacts. If a 
girl drops out, it is the “madam” who ensures that she is replaced by calling on 
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the services of the minibus drivers and of the lieutenants. To the sex workers, she 
comes across as attentive, even protective. The female mediators sort out the girls’ 
administrative problems. They make sure that the girls also earn some money. The 
girls often regard them as a “second mother”. 
Here we see in a first phase a movement from the traditional “violent entre-
preneurship” in prostitution towards a somewhat more humane approach, which 
leaves more room for “agency” with the sex workers and which humanises their 
immediate environment by inserting an intermediary between the prostitute and the 
violence, which nonetheless remains inherent to the structure. One consequence is 
that the girls are less inclined to complain about the entrepreneurs and their envi-
ronment to the police or the prosecuting authorities, especially if one considers that 
the courts in their region of origin, where their families live as well, will ultimately 
deal with the cases.
In a second phase under the first profile, we see an evolution towards a post-vio-
lent entrepreneurship where the criminal entrepreneur learns that, in order to maxi-
mize his profits, he has to capitalize on the new victim profile and has to approach 
and stimulate these “victims” from a new perspective: a poorer population, pos-
sibly placing them in a position of independence in Belgium. This is an important 
change in how the relation between human trafficking and prostitution is conceived. 
In the new perception, the sex workers are sometimes even business partners and 
interested parties, and actions are taken from a so-called win-win situation. Why 
should the entrepreneur then still be called an exploiter? Because the sex workers 
do remain in a subordinate and exploited position. In addition, they can be played 
off against each other competitively because of their over-supply. Their situation 
continues to be one of excessive economic exploitation in terms of the legislation 
in the country of destination.  
With the second profile, the networks are internationally oriented and composed 
of diverse nationalities such as Bulgarians, Albanians, Italians, Romanians and Bel-
gians. They collaborate on an individual basis and all fall back on the expertise of 
their own ethnic group of origin. Collaboration is flexible and based on supply and 
demand. They are all specialized in their own domain. They have business networks 
that focus on maximisation of profits. Belgians and Italo-Belgians manage the bars 
and the houses. The sex workers are there on a voluntary basis. Most of them come 
from Bulgaria, a few from Romania. “Madams” occupy a prominent place within 
the structure, in common with the previous profile. They are mostly ex-sex workers 
of the same nationality as the current sex workers. They provide board and lodgings 
for the girls, collect the prostitution money, and act as intermediaries between the 
girls and the outside world and between the girls and the other parties involved in 
the business structure. 
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In the second profile, we observe that the Bulgarian criminal entrepreneurs are 
rather in a second-line role in terms of outsourcing. Albanian pimps, in particular, 
play an active role in this profile. These are mainly Albanian pimps who no longer 
occupy a dominant role after having been pushed out subsequent to numerous judi-
cial actions and, because of the market position of the willing and mobile Bulgarian 
sex workers, who have learnt that they need to collaborate with the other ethnic 
groups (e.g. Belgo-Sicilians, as in our case study, Italians,…)  have professional-
ised.
What the Bulgarian entrepreneurs in the network take care of is the creation of 
counterfeit official documents and the supply of motivated sex workers via small 
transport companies under Bulgarian control. The destination countries are Ger-
many, The Netherlands and Belgium. The minibuses carry both sex workers and 
male construction workers, who come to work for rock-bottom prices. This brings 
us to the third profile.
In the “labour” profile, we see Bulgarians from the Turkish minority from cities 
such as Plovdiv, Car Kayolan, Biala, Dve Mogili and Russe, who are put to work in 
Belgium for very low wages. Belgo-Turkish building contractors buy ramshackle 
houses in Belgium that they then have renovated by these Turko-Bulgarians. Rack-
renters accommodate them in houses. Here, too, we see that these houses, as in 
profile 2, are the property of people who are often associated with a Belgo-Italian 
criminal milieu. Sometimes their wives accompany the building workers, if the 
women are prepared to be put to work in prostitution. (Here, one may see an inter-
esting gender dimension that also deserves further research.). In this profile, too, the 
workers return to Bulgaria every three months. In this modus operandi, the risks of 
judicial prosecution for the Bulgarian entrepreneurs remain relatively low.
It is quite interesting to see in several dossiers about Bulgarian human traffickers 
in Belgium that Italo-Belgians can be identified, who either make houses available 
as brothels or as safe houses. It is noticeable in other dossiers that they sometimes 
also specialise in making lawyers available if the judicial authorities are prosecut-
ing human traffickers. It seems rather that they have withdrawn from money-laun-
dering operations and the provision of “useful” services, including prostitution, in 
which they themselves were previously engaged. The size of the money-laundering 
operations arising from human trafficking should not be underestimated. In its most 
recent report, the Belgian anti-money laundering unit CFI pointed out the fact that 
“human trafficking and trading in clandestine workers is increasing in importance 
in the reported money laundering dossiers. Together with dossiers relating to the 
exploitation of prostitution these dossiers represent 15.6% of the money laundering 
reported in 2008” (CFI, 2008).
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THE SHIFT TOWARDS “PROACTIVE LEARNING 
ORGANISATIONS”
These Bulgarian business networks are difficult to combat. The criminal entre-
preneurs remain in Bulgaria and ensure via their “madams” that the money from 
prostitution comes back to Bulgaria, where they invest it in their companies and 
hotels. In doing this, they risk nothing and operate from within Bulgaria, where they 
strengthen their position of respect.
The Bulgarian human traffickers active in Belgium establish structures that in-
terrupt the direct link between the coordinators and the actual prostitution or labour 
exploitation. The sex workers and the illegally employed and exploited workers 
end up in a position in which, at least, the appearance is given that they are working 
autonomously. This makes the production of evidence in the context of combating 
human trafficking more difficult. For the Belgian police and judicial authorities, 
for whom the payment of monies is an important piece of evidence, it has become 
much more difficult to prove, for example, on the basis of observations, that the 
monies handed over exceed the rental costs or are the proceeds of prostitution. In 
fact the “madam” is the person who has taken up a key position in the dynamics of 
the financial transactions. 
In addition to the position of the “madam”, the attribution of “agency” to the sex 
worker herself is clearly the effect of a learning process among the Bulgarian entre-
preneurs. In contrast to the presence of the “madams”, the “agency” for sex workers 
had already emerged and been noticed in several dossiers from the previous years. 
The “madams” were probably also concurrently present then, but their specific role 
had not really attracted attention in previous dossiers (Leman and Janssens, 2008). 
Within the legal structure, the sex workers often work as self-employed persons 
who have expressly taken on the responsibility for what they do by means of an 
agreement signed by them in advance. Sometimes via their signature they obtain, 
often without knowing it, a share – although very limited – within the company that 
rents rooms for prostitution. The sex workers, but also the construction workers 
who work for rock-bottom prices, get the impression they are working in a win-win 
situation. Victim statements are thus more difficult to obtain and, in itself, prostitu-
tion on one’s own initiative is, if you are not being exploited, legally permitted in 
Belgium. 
It does occur occasionally that a sex worker has managed to cover herself against 
financial exploitation and has, for example, stipulated in advance the acquisition of 
a property (land or a villa) in Bulgaria. What the person concerned misses, however, 
is that everything can be undone via a notary in the region of origin, who allows 
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him/herself to be corrupted and replaces the name of the woman in the deed of sale 
by that of the Bulgarian entrepreneur.
In Belgium, too, the police and court investigation of the management compa-
nies involved who rent brothels for prostitution, is likewise not an easy task. What 
we see in these companies is that there are people who have taken on the job of 
business manager for a small sum. These people belong to the marginal and finan-
cially less well-off Belgian milieu and, for that matter, they do not have the slightest 
clue what the company of which they are directors actually does. However, they are 
the people who can legally be called to account after the completion of an investiga-
tion, whereby it has to be stated that financially nothing can be recuperated, because 
the persons involved have nothing. In addition, these people are completely useless 
when it comes to collecting additional information about the structure’s set-up. 
The money flows have themselves become much less easily traceable, because 
they run via couriers and almost never via regular banking systems.
CONCLUSIONS
The image that comes to the fore from our analysis is one of organisations that 
are successful in all sorts of ways at covering themselves against police- and judi-
cial investigations, and that, at the same time, in many places and many ways – both 
in the regions of origin and in the country in which the activities take place – they 
manage to infiltrate the economy. This allows them to get stronger and to inter-
weave themselves better into the life of the broader society.
It seems improbable that the battle against international human trafficking, as 
constructed in our files, can be won without coherent, political and judicial action 
within the European Union, and without a very active, effective and efficient ap-
proach to the financial transactions and possible money laundering operations that 
we see taking place around certain entrepreneurs in these countries. It is most un-
likely that the fight can be won if the focus is mainly and almost solely placed on the 
sex workers or the illegally employed workers, where it is obvious that the entre-
preneurs can be hit primarily by an investigation of possible fraudulent companies 
and their complete financial dismantlement. These entrepreneurs have no reason 
whatsoever to cease their activities if their proceeds are not taken away from them 
and their initiatives are not additionally subject to serious financial penalties. 
As the situation is now evolving, the entrepreneurs, with the approach that they 
have adopted at present, have little chance of being punished, which also entails 
that they have no reason at all to stop their activities. 
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johan LeMan, stef janssens 
Bugarsko trgovanje ljudima u Belgiji i proaktivno poduzetničko 
učenje: razvoj 2002. – 2009.
SAŽETAK
U radu se raspravlja o mehanizmima proaktivnog učenja u bugarsko-belgijskom trgovanju 
ljudima između 2002. i 2007. putem tri profila, svaki put počinjući studijom slučaja. Profi-
li i slučajevi rezultat su dubinske analize šesnaest belgijskih sudskih spisa. Analiza otkriva 
tri profila: naknadno nasilno poduzetništvo u prostituciji (2002. – 2005.), međunarodno i 
međuetničko poduzetništvo u prostituciji (2004.) i izrabljivanje rada (2004. – 2005.). Svaki 
se put u poduzetnikâ može primijetiti napredak u učenju usporedimo li njihove aktivnosti s 
onima njihovih prethodnika opisanim u prijašnjim radovima istih istraživača. Iz te se analize 
izdvaja predodžba da je riječ o jednoj od organizacija koje se na sve načine uspješno štite od 
policijskih i sudskih istraga, a da se istodobno na mnogim mjestima i na mnogo načina – kako 
u regijama porijekla tako i u zemlji u kojoj se odvijaju te aktivnosti – uspijevaju infiltrirati u 
gospodarstvo.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI: Bugarska, trgovanje ljudima, izrabljivanje rada, napredak u učenju
johan LeMan, stef janssens 
Le trafic d’ êtres humains de la Bulgarie vers la Belgique – un 
apprentissage proactif : développements 2002 – 2009
RÉSUMÉ
L’article explique les mécanismes d’apprentissage proactif au sein des trafics bulgaro-belges 
produits entre 2002 et 2007, à travers trois profils découlant chacun d’une étude de cas. Les 
données de l’article reposent sur une étude approfondie de seize dossiers judiciaires bel-
ges. L’on distingue trois profils: un entrepreneuriat violent développé dans la prostitution 
(2005–2005), un entreprenariat international et interethnique lié à la prostitution (2004) et 
un entreprenariat d’exploitation nette du travail (2004–2005). Dans chacun des cas est vi-
sible l’évolution des entrepreneurs par rapport aux activités de leurs prédécesseurs, décrites 
par les mêmes chercheurs dans des articles antérieurs. Dits profils laissent transparaître de 
véritables mécanismes d’apprentissage et donnent l’image d’organisations très performantes 
ayant appris à s’assurer une protection efficace contre toutes sortes d’actions policières et 
judiciaires. Elles y parviennent de diverses façons, aussi bien dans leur pays d’origine que de 
destination – là où elles opèrent – et réussissent à infiltrer l’économie locale.
MOTS CLÉS : Bulgarie, traite, exploitation du travail, apprentissage proactif
